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If it Ain't Broke, Don't Fix it
by JOHN R. WORTHINGTON
Law reviews dealing with issues facing the communications
industry, like the industry itself, are vulnerable to being over-
taken by events. This law review recently published a Sympo-
sium devoted to last year's hottest telecommunications topic -
legislative proposals to transfer authority to enforce the his-
toric judgment in United States v. AT&T from the federal
courts to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).' At
present, these legislative proposals are on hold in Congress; the
underlying substantive issues, however, are now being litigated
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The Department of Justice (Department) and the Bell Oper-
ating Companies (BOCs) are now trying to persuade the court
to do directly what the transfer legislation sought to accomplish
indirectly - to allow the BOCs into telecommunications lines
of business from which the Modification of Final Judgment
(MFJ) had excluded them. On February 2, 1987, the Depart-
ment of Justice released its first triennial report on the contin-
uing need for the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions. These
1. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter AT&T].
This judgment is often called the Modification of Final Judgment or MFJ. See Worth-
ington, The Case for Continued Judicial Enforcement of the AT&T Decree, 9 CoMM/
ENT L.J. 75 n.l (1986) [hereinafter Worthington]. The divested Bell Operating Compa-
nies (BOCs) have recently confirmed that this transfer legislation is unconstitutional.
Commenting on an AT&T proposal that the FCC rather than the Department of Jus-
tice screen BOC requests for waivers of the line-of-business restrictions, BellSouth,
one of the BOCs, stated that "the Constitution itself appear[s] to forbid the transfer of
antitrust law enforcement jurisdiction from the Justice Department to any other
agency." Comments of BellSouth Corporation on the Justice Department Recom-
mendations Concerning Section II(D) of the Modification of Final Judgment at 47
(filed Mar. 13, 1987), United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No. 82-0192
(D.D.C.). A fortiori, separation of powers principles forbid transfer of antitrust en-
forcement jurisdiction from a federal court to an executive branch agency. For a dis-
cussion of the constitutional issues, see generally Worthington, supra at 89-97.
2. Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line-of-
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification
of Final Judgment (filed Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter DOJ Report]. Along with this
report, the Department submitted a study by its consultant, Dr. Peter Huber. P. Hu-
ber, The Geodesic Network 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry
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restrictions limit the BOCs to local telephone service unless
they show that the proposed diversification would not create
any significant possibility of abuse of their local monopoly
power.' In its report, the Department recommended that these
restrictions should be all but eliminated.
A broad range of commentors on the Department's report
agree 4 that the Department's and the BOCs' frontal attack on
the line-of-business restrictions, like the indirect assault of the
proposed transfer legislation, should fail. This article, building
on the foundation laid by an article published earlier in the
Symposium, 5 explains why the Department's recommendations
are fundamentally flawed and totally unprincipled. The article
also responds to the article written for this Symposium by U S
West, the holding company for three of the divested BOCs,8 and
addresses, in particular, U S West's unfounded claim that regu-
lation can prevent the anticompetitive conduct that the MFJ
was crafted to prevent.
The line-of-business restrictions take the BOCs' incentive to
use control of their local telephone monopolies to compete un-
[hereinafter Huber Report]. These submissions are part of the first of the triennial
reviews, mandated by the court, of the continuing need for the line-of-business re-
strictions. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 195.
3. Section II(D) of the MFJ prohibits the BOCs from providing interexchange
(i.e., long-distance) telecommunications services or information services, manufactur-
ing telecommunications equipment, or providing any other product or service (other
than exchange communications, marketing of customer premises equipment, and di-
rectory advertising) that is not a natural monopoly actually regulated by tariff. See
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
4. See, e.g., Comments of the Consumer Federation of America, United Church
of Christ Office of Communication and the United States Public Interest Research
Group on the Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the
Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modi-
fication of Final Judgment at 2-4 (filed Mar. 13, 1987); Comment of National Associa-
tion of State Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) on the Department of Justice
Recommendations at 2 (filed Mar. 13,-1987); Comments of the Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission on the "Report and Recommendations of the United
States Concerning the Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating
Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment" at 25 (filed Mar. 11, 1987); Com-
ments of Taconic Telephone Corp., et al. at 4-5 (filed Mar. 13, 1987); Comments of the
Independent Data Communications Manufacturers Association, Inc. at iii-vi (filed
Mar. 13, 1987); Opposition of Electronic Industries Association Information and Tele-
communications Technologies Group at 2-3 (filed Mar. 13, 1987).
5. Worthington, supra note 1, discusses the rationale of the MFJ and some of the
public policy reasons why its line-of-business restrictions remain vital to the preserva-
tion of a competitive and responsive telecommunications industry.
6. McKenna & Slyter, The Modification of Final Judgment: An Exercise in Ju-
dicial Overkill, 9 CoMM/ENT L.J. 9 (1986) [hereinafter McKenna & Slyter].
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fairly in related markets that they seek to enter.7 As long as
the BOCs retain control of the local bottlenecks and competi-
tors in related markets must depend on the BOCs to reach
their customers, the line-of-business restrictions, enforced by
the federal courts, will be the only effective means to preserve
fair competition. Regulatory prohibitions against discrimina-
tion and cross-subsidy cannot contain the BOCs' virtually un-
limited opportunity for bottleneck abuse." None of the factors
that required imposition of the line-of-business restrictions in
1982 have changed. For the same reasons that the district court
approved those restrictions as in the public interest,9 and that
the Supreme Court affirmed its decision,10 they remain an "es-
sential ingredient of the decree"" necessary to "prevent recur-
rence of precisely the same structural and economic incentives




When the MFJ was proposed, many complained that divesti-
ture would destroy the best telephone system in the world.
The rallying cry was, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Divestiture-
driven events have since proved that our telephone system was
indeed broken and in need of fixing. The elimination of the
Bell System's domination of virtually all aspects of telecommu-
nications has permitted an ever-widening array of new services
and products to become available to American consumers at
steadily declining prices. Notwithstanding predictions that
AT&T had garnered for itself the most profitable portions of
the System's business and condemned the divested BOCs to the
dregs, the BOCs have succeeded, probably beyond their own
expectations, and AT&T has yet to achieve the pre-divestiture
financial targets that it set for itself.'3
7. Worthington, supra note 1, at 77-78.
8. Id. at 78-80.
9. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-95.
10. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
11. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 859 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
12. Brief of the United States in Response to the Court's Memorandum of May 25,
1982, at 7 (filed June 14, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131.
13. See The Baby Bells are Outrunning Their Parent, Philadelphia Inquirer, July
11, 1986, at 1-c, AT&T's Comments on the Report and Recommendations of the United
States at 7 (Mar. 13, 1987).
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Although the Department and the BOCs are calling for fur-
ther monumental change, there is no need to fix a telephone
system that, by any measure, is generally performing well, with
excellent prospects for continuing improvement. The Depart-
ment's triennial report points with pride to the many examples
of the MFJ's success: tremendous strides in implementing
equal access;14 the unprecedented growth of competition in the
interexchange, 15 information services,'" and equipment mar-
kets;17 and a promised redesign of BOC "local networks to ac-
commodate the maximum number of information service
providers."'" It is ironic that the DOJ and the BOCs are citing
the MFJ's successes as justification for its repeal.
II
The Department's About-Face
Perhaps it is not surprising that the BOCs want to do away
with any restriction on their activities - even though one BOC
consultant recently suggested that the line-of-business restric-
tions have probably saved the BOCs from wasting "$5 billion in
14. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 18-23, 68-70. While substantial progress has been
made, equal access, unfortunately, is far from complete. AT&T's competitors still re-
ceive low-grade, discriminatory access from more than one fourth of the BOCs' access
lines. Huber Report, supra note 2, at Table IX.7. MCI has requests outstanding for
equal access in more than one thousand end offices across the country. See MCI's
Objections to the [Regional Bell Operating Companies'] August 1 Filings Concerning
Bona Fide Requests for Equal Access Conversions at 3, United States v. Western Elec.
Co. (filed Aug. 15, 1986); see Memorandum of the United States Regarding Bell Corn-
pany Schedules for Equal Access at 25, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (filed Nov.
21, 1986) (conversion schedules of two BOCs, including U S West, are unreasonable).
Serious questions remain whether the BOCs are providing technically equal access to
all long-distance companies. MCI's Comments on the October 31, 1986 Report by the
United States Concerning the Status of Equal Access at 7-9, United States v. Western
Elec. Co. (filed Jan. 9, 1987). The BOCs have yet to meet their equal access obligations
under the MFJ for nondiscriminatory access for other services, including 800 service,
cellular radio services, credit cards, and pay telephones. Id at 10-21.
15. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 65-67.
16. Id at 112.
17. Id at 162-63, 171 (central office equipment), 198 (PBX equipment), 200 (termi-
nal equipment).
18. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 189; see DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 109 (affirming
that the information services restriction was intended "to provide an incentive for the
BOCs to develop 'open' networks conducive to information services competition").
Open Network Architecture (ONA), if ever implemented, would therefore be one of
the restriction's predictable successes. Moreover, to the extent that ONA separately
provides the elements of information service access, ONA merely represents compli-
ance with Section II(A) of the MFJ, which obligates the BOCs to provide "unbun-
dled" information access.
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dumb acquisitions."19 The position taken by the Department of
Justice is, however, a great surprise. The Department's recom-
mendations represent a complete break with its earlier, consis-
tent support for the line-of-business restrictions. This abrupt
about-face remains largely unexplained.
The dramatic change in the Department's position is easily
demonstrated:
e The Department previously recognized that "there is lit-
tle possibility that regulation is capable of detecting or prevent-
ing the very subtle forms of discrimination that would be
available to the BOCs." 2 But now the Department would rely
on regulation to prevent discrimination - and cross-subsidiza-
tion as well.21
* The Department previously stated that "careful scrutiny
of line-of-business requests is not regulatory intrusion,' '  and
that it "never sought" to have the court assume regulatory
functions.2 But now it characterizes the court's activities as
"judicial regulation."'
* The Department previously urged the court that an equal
access injunction could not be effective.25 But now it would rely
on just such an injunction."
* The Department previously recognized, in the post-divest-
iture context, that it is impossible to separate alleged" 'efficien-
cies of vertical integration' from the abuses of monopoly
power" and that "where a meaningful potential for cross-subsi-
19. Wall St. J., June 9, 1986, at 44, col. 2 (quoting Howard Anderson, president of
Yankee Group).
20. Response of the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification
of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 23320, 23336 (1982) [hereinafter Response to Public
Comments], AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131.
21. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 104.
22. Reply of the United States to Responses to the Department's Proposals Re-
garding Section VIII(C) Waivers at 51, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (filed Apr.
5,1984) [hereinafter DOJ 1984 Reply], United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp.
846 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
23. Brief of the United States in Response to the Court's Memorandum of May 25,
1982 at 4, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (filed June 14, 1982) [hereinafter DOJ
June 1982 Brief], AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131.
24. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 7. By the same token, it is incorrect to character-
ize the Department's review of waiver requests as, "in effect, detailed regulatory over-
sight of the BOC's business plans." Denvir, The Dole Bill Freeing the Telephone
Company Seven? 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 113, 121-22 (1986).
25. Competitive Impact Statement in Connection With the Proposed Modification
of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7181 (1982) [hereinafter Competitive Impact
Statement].
26. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 70.
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dization exists, the choice made by the decree is to presume
that the benefits of such efficiencies [of integration] are out-
weighed by the potential for harm to competition.127 But now
the Department wants to jettison the information services re-
strictions because of theoretical efficiencies that the Depart-
ment itself admits may not exist or be significant. 2
0 The Department previously stated that the court should
consider the impact on local ratepayers in evaluating requests
for waiver of the line-of-business restrictions.2 But now the
Department argues that the MFJ "is not intended to address





9 The Department previously called it "disingenuous" and
equivalent to "a request that.., the Court suspend all ability to
comprehend reality" to argue that the potential for new anti-
trust actions was an adequate substitute for continued enforce-
ment of the MFJ.3 1 But now it advances just this argument.
3 2
0 The Department previously stated categorically that
"[t]here is simply no basis for the conclusion that the Depart-
ment lacks either the competence or the will effectively to en-
force the [decree]."' 3 But it now suggests that it lacks the
competence, the resources, or perhaps both, to discharge its en-
forcement responsibilities.'
There is simply no way to account for this 180-degree change
of course - other than by a change in personnel, a change in
27. DOJ 1984 Reply, supra note 22, at 34, 36-37.
28. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 114, 115, 136.
29. Memorandum of the United States Concerning Removal of the Line of Busi-
ness Restrictions Pursuant to Section VIII(C) and Response to Motions of Bell Atlan-
tic and Bell South at 14 (filed Feb. 21,1984). United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F.
Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The district
court agreed. Id. at 861-63.
30. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 47. Applauding the Department's current posi-
tion, U S West criticizes as unlawful judicial revision any reliance by the court on the
MFJ's "principles and purposes." McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 60-62. But this
approach is completely consistent with settled precedent. See, e.g., White v.
Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1982) ("it is not true" that a court must read
one provision of a decree "without reference to the decree's evident purpose").
31. DOJ 1984 Reply, supra note 22, at 49. The court agreed that "[ilf the level of
the prohibited activity had to rise to that of an antitrust violation, these provisions
would have been unnecessary and redundant." United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. at 869.
32. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 53, 75 n.152, 124 n.254, 141, 170.
33. Reply Brief of the United States, at 52-53, United States v. Western Elec. Co.
(filed June 24, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131.
34. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 135.
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the Department's commitment to enforcing the antitrust laws,
or by special interest, high pressure politics.
III
Continued Conditions Requiring the Restrictions
Since the court entered the judgment, nothing has occurred
which would diminish the BOCs' ability or incentive to use
their local bottleneck power to cripple competition in telecom-
munications markets where they are permitted to compete.
The BOCs' stranglehold on virtually all domestic and interna-
tional telecommunications remains intact. The Department
concedes that local exchange networks carry 99.9 percent of all
interexchange traffic and 99.999 percent rely on them.35 Those
networks - millions of miles of copper wire strung on poles,
buried in conduits and tied together by BOC switches --- still
provide the only practical means of making and completing vir-
tually every telephone call.
Nor has there been any change in the inability of regulators
to prevent the abuses that inevitably accompany BOC competi-
tion in markets dependent on fair access to the local exchange.
"At the heart of the government's case in United States v.
AT&T was the failure of regulation to safeguard competition in
the face of powerful incentives and abilities of a firm engaged
in the provision of both regulated monopoly and competitive
services.'"'3 This failure of regulatory protection continues.
U S West describes in detail the FCC's efforts, beginning in
the 1960s, to promote competition.3 However, it omits the
critical fact that it was the antitrust laws which were ultimately
required to provide effective enforcement and remedies to
achieve competition. The findings in the MCI and Litton cases
demonstrated that the Bell System effectively ignored regula-
tory controls and that the regulators could do nothing about
it.38 Further, none of the allegedly "new" regulatory ap-
35. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 80; Huber Report, supra note 3, at 3.9, Table
IX.5.
36. Response to Public Comments, supra note 20, at 23336. See Worthington,
supra note 1, at 78-80, 82 & n.32.
37. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 28-42.
38. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1139-60 (7th Cir. 1983) (Bell System engaged in anticompetitive conduct against inter-
exchange carriers without regard to pro-competitive policies of FCC), cert denied, 464
U.S. 891 (1983); Litton Systems v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 790-802 (2d
Cir. 1983) (discrimination against competing equipment manufacturers in knowing vi-
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proaches devised since 1984 have been tested in the context in
which the Department and U S West claim the regulations will
work, that is, the context of anticompetitive incentives rekin-
dled by BOC re-entry in telecommunications businesses depen-
dent on access to the local exchange.
As growing competition has accelerated the pace of change in
the telecommunications business, regulators have become even
less able to deal with the myriad ways in which BOCs can lev-
erage their bottleneck power to impede competition in telecom-
munications markets dependent on fair, nondiscriminatory
access to the local exchange.- The Department argued in 1982
that regulatory efforts are doomed, not necessarily by lack of
good intentions, but rather by the impossibility of determining
"in advance the discriminatory potential inherent in to-
morrow's technology."'  U S West emphasizes regulatory reli-
ance on Open Network Architecture (ONA) to prevent dis-
crimination and cross-subsidization, 41 but ONA is today, as U S
West's chairman put it, simply "a state of mind."' The Depart-
ment admits that "full implementation of ONA is several years
away,143 and the Department's consultant stated, "even when
fully deployed, ONA will be available only on digital switches,
which will then still serve under one quarter of all access
lines."
'4
Regulatory protections against cross-subsidization are
equally illusory and untested. U S West would rely on the
FCC's "new" cost accounting rules.45 But the methodology that
U S West and the FCC claim is new is in fact the same method-
olation of FCC regulations), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). U S West implies that
the Bell System's anticompetitive conduct in the 1970s was somehow related to "ambi-
guity" in FCC orders. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 29-30, 31. However, the
evidence showed that AT&T used regulatory standards in bad faith without regard to
its interpretation of FCC decisions. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d at 1139-41.
39. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 81-84 (describing opportunities for discrimi-
nation and cross-subsidization).
40. Reponse to Public Comments, supra note 20, at 23336.
41. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 49-56. According to U S West, ONA com-
bines regulatory requirements of nondiscrimination with antitrust rules requiring
equal access to essential facilities. Id. at 50.
42. The Spur, vol. 4 no. 3, at 2 (U S West internal newsletter quoting Jack McAl-
lister). The limits of ONA are discussed in Worthington, supra note 1, at 105 & nn.
141-44.
43. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 142.
44. Huber Report, supra note 2, at 6.24 (emphasis added).
45. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 56 & n.252.
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ology that the FCC has used for the last decade,46 and the FCC
itself concedes that it "never succeeded in actually" using this
methodology prior to divestiture.47
Even if there was a sound theoretical framework for the illu-
sory goal of cost allocation, the FCC cannot put theory into
practice without the resources to audit the Bell Companies' ac-
counting submissions. As the Department recognizes, "[t]he
failure to devote sufficient resources to the audit process will
reduce any prophylactic program, no matter how sound in the-
ory or principle, to a sham that deceives rather than protects
ratepayers and state regulators. ' 4 The FCC's resources are in-
adequate to the task: "the Commission currently employs only
24 auditors, and they have very limited funds for travel; ' 49 the
FCC's recent budget request cut one of its audit teams;so the
FCC admits that its current resources do not permit it to "mon-
itor, audit and investigate cost allocations [among carriers' de-
regulated and regulated businesses] on an item-by-item
basis;' ' 51 and the FCC Chairman just characterized its funding
in recent years as "inadequate."' 2 In 1982 the court accurately
noted "the problems of supervision by a relatively poorly-fi-
nanced, poorly-staffed government agency" over a gigantic cor-
poration "with almost unlimited resources in funds and gifted
personnel are no more likely to be overcome in the future than
46. This methodology was first adopted by the FCC in 1976. AT&T, Long Lines
Department, Revisions of Tariff FCC No. 260 Private Line Services, Series 5000
(TELPAK), 61 F.C.C.2d 1441 (1976), recon., 64 F.C.C.2d 971 (1977), further recon., 67
F.C.C.2d 1441 (1978), affd sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981). It was codified in the Interim Cost
Allocation Manual in 1981. AT&T, Manual and Procedures for the Allocation of
Costs, 84 F.C.C.2d 384, modified, 86 F.C.C.2d 667 (1981), affd sub nom. MCI Telecom-
munications Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
47. Report and Order, par. 11, Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Ser-
vice From Costs of Unregulated Activities, CC Docket No. 86-111 (released Feb. 6,
1987). The reasons given by the FCC for its past implementation problems - "the
massiveness and complexity of the data," "the extreme fungibility of the plant," and
"the high degree of substitutability amongst the services" - apply equally today. Id..
48. Comments of the United States Department of Justice at 36, Joint Cost Pro-
ceeding, CC Docket No. 86-111 (filed June 30, 1986).
49. Id. at 36 n.63.
50. Written Statement of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, before the Subcomm.
on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Comm. at 3 (Feb. 18, 1987).
51. "Is the FCC Willing to Bar Abuse?" Computer World, at 1, 7 (Feb. 9, 1987)
(quoting FCC staff attorney Jane Jackson).
52. Telecommunications Reports, Feb. 23, 1987, at 25 (quoting Mark S. Fowler's
testimony before a Senate appropriations subcommittee).
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they were in the past. '5 3 Nothing has happened in the last four
years to change that conclusion.
U S West does not discuss the role of state regulators. State
regulators probably would not - although they should - play
an important role in preventing cross-subsidization. "[T]he pos-
sibility of challenge from cross-subsidized [BOC] affiliates is a
large concern" to providers of information services (which are
often intrastate in character); on the other hand, cross-subsidy
constitutes "an almost negligible concern for rate payers."55
Cross subsidy problems for the providers of information serv-
ices "must be weighed in light of the fact that local exchange
operations are huge, and electronic information service mar-
kets are comparatively tiny."' State regulators would there-
fore have little incentive to allocate their limited resources to
this problem.57
U S West fails also to come to terms with the costs of its "reg-
ulatory solution." U S West bemoans the uncertainty and delay
associated with the procedure for obtaining waivers from the
line-of-business restrictions.ms Yet, FCC proceedings to obtain
approval of new services are often more protracted than the
MFJ's waiver process.5 9 The Department and the Bell System
explored the possibility of injunctions regulating the behavior
53. See 552 F. Supp. at 168.
54. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 13 & n.14. U S West implies that most
states promote intrastate competition, id. at 47 n.195; but that proposition is demon-
strably false. Approximately 26 states expressly prohibit local exchange competition,
Huber Report, supra note 2, at 2.11, and many states prohibit resale of local exchange
facilities in the form of shared tenant services arrangements, id. at 2.10-2.11.
55. Huber Report, supra note 2, at 6.36.
56. Id.
57. Even if state regulators focused on information services and had adequate
tools, "[t]he broad sweep of the Regional Companies, with their various competitive
and non-competitive subsidiaries and affiliates, constitutes a signfiicant impediment
to effective oversight by local regulators who are confined to a single state." United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 n.22 (D.D.C.), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (1987).
State regulators have been particularly critical of U S West with respect to cross-
subsidization. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, "Sum-
mary Report on the Regional Holding Company Investigations," Sept. 18, 1986, at 21.
58. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 57-58.
59. For example, New Jersey Bell's request for a Computer II waiver regarding
an enhanced service involving protocol conversion was pending for nearly one year
before being conditionally granted and for another nine months before final approval.
See Protocol Conversion Waiver Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 1057 (1985); In re New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co.. Mimeo No. 1426 (FCC Dec. 13, 1985). An FCC investigation into New
Jersey Bell's tariff for this service remains open. See In re New Jersey Bell Tel Co.,
Memorandum Opinion & Order, Mimeo No. CC-2381 (FCC Feb. 4, 1986).
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of the integrated Bell System as an alternative to the structural
relief of divestiture, but ultimately labeled those efforts "Quag-
mire I" and "Quagmire II.' 60 That characterization is equally
apt for federal and state regulatory proceedings.
More fundamentally, history shows that regulatory approval
of new BOC services is many times just a prelude to years of
antitrust litigation - litigation that usually begins with ulti-
mately unsuccessful Bell claims that federal regulation
preempts the antitrust laws.6 U S West acknowledges what a
"costly process" antitrust litigation can become. 2 Yet antitrust
litigation is exactly what would follow a repeal of the MFJ's
line-of-business restrictions. By providing structural relief that
ended years of litigation and legislative turmoil, the MFJ has
given the industry a significant measure of well needed predict-




The Department and the BOCs would tear up the decree and
rewrite it to suit their current ideological preferences. U S
West openly admits that it advocates "a de novo look at this
time" in the line-of-business restrictions." The Department
has, as a practical matter, taken the same approach. The De-
partment's treatment of monopoly leveraging illustrates that
its current proposals reflect a change in economic philosophy.
During the AT&T trial, the Department argued, and the court
agreed, that the antitrust laws prohibit a firm's use of "its mo-
nopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in
60. AT&T's Comments on the Report and Recommendations of the United States
at 22, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (filed Mar. 13, 1987). The inherent ineffec-
tiveness of non-structural relief is discussed in Worthington, supra note 1, at 78-80.
61. See McKenna & Slyter, supra note 6, at 25 & nn. 81-82 (acknowledging uni-
form judicial rejection of the Bell System's antitrust immunity arguments).
62. I& at 11.
63. Consistent interpretation and enforcement of the judgment is essential to per-
mit members of the industry "to order their present and future conduct on a decree's
provisions." United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 604 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.D.C.
1985). A consent decree, like any judgment, is subject to the "strong policy of repose
normally accorded past decisions." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 642 F.2d 578,
585 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64. Comments of U S West, Inc. Concerning Report and Recommendations of the
United States Concerning the Line of Business Restrictions Imposed on Bell Operat-
ing Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment at 25 (filed Mar. 13, 1987).
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another market" even if "[r]elatively small market shares" in
the second market would be foreclosed to fair competition.65
Now, however, so long as "sales to a majority of the market
would still be open," the Department regards with equanimity
the prospect that unaffiliated equipment manufacturers would
be foreclosed from large segments of the equipment market if
the BOCs were permitted to manufacture and bought exclu-
sively from their manufacturing affiliates.66
Until 1982, the history of the Department of Justice's at-
tempt to deal with the Bell monopoly had not been encourag-
ing. As Professor Schwartz accurately stated in his
introduction to this Symposium, while the government always
seemed to win, the plea bargain ultimately proved advanta-
geous to the Bell System.67 The Department now appears
poised to repeat this reprehensible scenario. After the nation
has endured the upheaval of divestiture and is beginning to en-
joy the competitive benefits of that wrenching event, the BOCs
and the Department want to recreate "precisely the same
structural and economic incentives that divestiture was
designed to eliminate,"" and "to exchange one nationwide mo-
nopoly with the incentive and ability to exploit monopoly
power and injure competition for several smaller monopolies
with the identical incentives and abilities.169 Consumers and
competition deserve a better fate.7°
65. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1379 & n.174
(D.D.C. 1981) (quoting Berkey Photo. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980)).
66. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 176.
67. Schwartz, Forum and Substance: Introduction to the Symposium, 9 COMM/
ENT L.J. 1, 2 (1986). The history of government capitulation to AT&T in the 1949
antitrust case is described in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 135-39.
68. DOJ June 1982 Brief, supra note 23, at 7.
69. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1095.
70. While success does not always come to the deserving, it has here. On Septem-
ber 10, 1987, the court, in a lengthy opinion, upheld the core line-of-business restric-
tions in the decree.
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